UNITED
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S/24560
15 September 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 11 SEPTEMBER 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit a note verbale with attachment dated 20 March 1991 from the Interests Section of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Washington, D.C. to the Embassy of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria to be forwarded to the United States Department of State on the violation of territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran by the forces of the United States in the Persian Gulf region.

It would be highly appreciated if this letter were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) M. Javad ZARIF
Ambassador
Deputy Permanent Representative

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Annex

The Interests Section of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Washington, D.C. presents its compliments to the Embassy of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria and has the honour to quote the attached messages in two copies, the original text and an unofficial translation received from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran. It is respectfully requested that the original text of the messages be transmitted to the United States Department of State and our office be informed of their response.

According to information received from officials of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, United States warships positioned in the Sea of Oman and the Persian Gulf have created a nuisance for Iranian sea-patrolling aircraft and American aircraft have intercepted routine sea-patrolling missions of Iranian aircraft on the following dates and locations:

A. Warnings by United States warships

1. On 4 December 1990 at 1108 hours, a United States warship at the position of N2454 and E5831 warned the pilot of an Iranian sea-patrolling aircraft, whose position was N2501 and E5831, not to get closer to the warship.

2. On 5 December 1990 at 1200 hours, a United States warship warned the pilot of an Iranian sea-patrolling aircraft, whose position was N2502 and E5838, not to get closer to the warship.

3. On 7 December 1990 at 1055 hours, a United States warship at the position of N2440 and E5835 warned the pilot of an Iranian sea-patrolling aircraft, whose position was N2447 and E5820, not to get closer to the warship.

4. On 8 December 1990 at 1015 hours, a United States warship at the position of N2441 and E5826 warned the pilot of an Iranian sea-patrolling aircraft, whose position was N2441 and E5816, not to get closer to the warship.

5. On 9 December 1990 at 1017 hours, a United States warship number 38 at the position of N2440 and E5809 warned the pilot of an Iranian sea-patrolling aircraft, whose position was N2432 and E5810, not to get closer to the warship.

6. On 13 December 1990 at 1110 hours, a United States warship at the position of N2435 and E5810 warned the pilot of an Iranian sea-patrolling aircraft, whose position was N2450 and E5750, to change its course.

7. On 14 December 1990 at 1123 hours, a United States warship at the position of N2438 and E5817 warned the pilot of an Iranian sea-patrolling aircraft, whose position was N2441 and E5810, not to get closer to the warship.

8. On 15 December 1990 at 1430 hours, a United States warship at the position of N2450 and E5800 warned the pilot of an Iranian sea-patrolling aircraft, whose position was N2451 and E5747, not to get closer to the warship.

9. On 16 December 1990 at 1025 hours, a United States warship warned the pilot of an Iranian sea-patrolling aircraft, whose position was N2443 and E5727 to change its course.

10. On 19 December 1990 at 1200 hours, a United States warship at the position of N2452 and E5757 warned the pilot of an Iranian sea-patrolling aircraft, whose position was N2510 and E5713, not to get closer to the warship.

B. Interceptions by United States aircraft

On 6 December 1990, a United States aircraft at the position of N2420 and E5820 intercepted and chased an Iranian sea-patrolling aircraft and by jamming the radio signals the Iranian aircraft was prevented from making any contact and/or conversation.

The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran protests such illegal activities by the Government of the United States.

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23 September 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 11 SEPTEMBER 1992 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Corrigendum

The title of document S/24560 should read as above.

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S/24561
15 September 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 11 SEPTEMBER 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit three notes verbales with attachments dated 25 February 1991, from the Interests Section of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Washington, D.C. to the Embassy of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria to be forwarded to the United States Department of State on the violation of territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran by the forces of the United States in the Persian Gulf region.

It would be highly appreciated if this letter were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) M. Javad ZARIF
Ambassador
Deputy Permanent Representative

Annex I

The Interests Section of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Washington, D.C. presents its compliments to the Embassy of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria and has the honour to quote the attached message in two copies, the original text and an unofficial translation received from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran. It is respectfully requested that the original text of the message be transmitted to the United States Department of State and our office be informed of their response.

According to information received from officials of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, United States warships positioned in the Sea of Oman and the Persian Gulf have created a nuisance for Iranian sea-patrolling aircraft and American aircraft have intercepted routine sea-patrolling missions of Iranian aircraft on the following dates and locations:

1. On 24 August 1990 at 0856 hours, United States warship number 30 at the position of N2559 and E5330 warned the pilot of an Iranian sea-patrolling aircraft, whose position was N2552 and E5334, not to get closer to the warship.

2. On 24 August 1990 at 1030 hours, a United States warship at the position of N2455 and E5840 warned the pilot of an Iranian sea-patrolling aircraft, whose position was N2511 and E5757, not to get closer to the warship.

3. On 3 September 1990 at 0210 hours, five United States warships at the position of N2431 and E5821 warned the pilot of an Iranian sea-patrolling aircraft, whose position was N2430 and E5808, not to get closer to the warship.

4. On 16 September 1990 at 1025 hours, a United States warship at the position of N2450 and E5750 warned the pilot of an Iranian sea-patrolling aircraft, whose position was N2415 and E5825, not to get closer to the warship.

5. On 25 September 1990 at 1201 hours, a United States warship at the position of N2410 and E5900 at a distance of 40 miles away warned the pilot of an Iranian sea-patrolling aircraft, whose position was N2436 and E5821, to change its course.

6. On 28 September 1990 at 1140 hours, a United States warship at the position of N2425 and E5800 at a distance of 40 miles away warned the pilot of an Iranian sea-patrolling aircraft, whose position was N2441 and N5720, to maintain a distance of 25 miles from the warship.

7. On 3 October 1990 at 1350 hours, four United States warships at the position of N2345 and E5918 gave a strong warning to the pilot of an Iranian sea-patrolling aircraft, whose position was N2355 and E5918, to change its course 40 degrees and to an altitude of 10,000 feet.

8. On 7 October 1990 at 1536 hours, a United States warship at the position of N2430 and E5808 warned the pilot of an Iranian sea-patrolling aircraft, whose position was N2453 and E5748, not to get closer to the warship.

9. On 12 October 1990 at 1105 hours, United States warship number 975 at the position of N2612 and E5355 warned the pilot of an Iranian sea-patrolling aircraft, whose position was N2611 and E5425, not to get closer to the warship.

10. On 14 October 1990 at 1116 hours, six United States warships at the position of N2430 and E5850 warned the pilot of an Iranian sea-patrolling aircraft, whose position was N2411 and E5844, not to get closer to the warship.

11. On 21 October 1990 at 1105 hours, United States warship number 975 at the position of N2612 and E5355 warned the pilot of an Iranian sea-patrolling aircraft, whose position was N2611 and E5425, not to get closer to the warship.

The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran protests such illegal actions by the Government of the United States.

Annex II

The Interests Section of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Washington, D.C. presents its compliments to the Embassy of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria and has the honour to quote the attached messages in two copies, the original text and an unofficial translation received from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran. It is respectfully requested that the original text of the messages be transmitted to the United States Department of State and our office be informed of their response.

According to information received from officials of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, United States warships positioned in the Sea of Oman and the Persian Gulf have created a nuisance for Iranian sea-patrolling aircraft and American aircraft have intercepted routine sea-patrolling missions of Iranian aircraft on the following dates and locations:

A. Warnings by United States warships

1. On 22 October 1990 at 1330 hours, a United States warship at the position of N2430 and E5802 warned the pilot of an Iranian sea-patrolling aircraft, whose position was N2432 and E5723, not to get closer to the warship and to change its course towards the north-west.

2. On 30 October 1990 at 1140 hours, a United States warship at the position of N2430 and E5830 warned the pilot of an Iranian sea-patrolling aircraft, whose position was N2423 and E5826, not to get closer to the warship.

3. On 2 November 1990 at 1151 hours, a United States warship at the position of N2445 and E5750 warned the pilot of an Iranian sea-patrolling aircraft, whose position was N2554 and E5735, not to get closer to the warship.

4. On 14 November 1990 at 1340 hours, a United States warship at the position of N2705 and E5100 warned the pilot of an Iranian sea-patrolling aircraft, whose position was N2715 and E5052, to change its course.

5. On 16 November 1990 at 1200 hours, a United States warship at the position of N2644 and E5626 warned the pilot of an Iranian sea-patrolling aircraft, whose position was N2644 and E5624, not to get closer to the warship.

6. On 16 November 1990 at 1255 hours, a United States warship at the position of N2450 and E5706 warned the pilot of an Iranian sea-patrolling aircraft, whose position was N2449 and E5740, not to get closer to the warship.

7. On 16 November 1990 at 1300 hours, a United States warship at the position of N2628 and E5556 warned the pilot of an Iranian sea-patrolling aircraft, whose position was N2630 and E5556, not to get closer to the warship.

8. On 21 November 1990 at 1400 hours, a United States warship at the position of N2650 and E5145 warned the pilot of an Iranian sea-patrolling aircraft, whose position was N2630 and E5110, not to get closer to the warship and guided the aircraft towards north.

B. Interceptions by United States aircraft

1. On 23 October 1990 at 1020 hours, two United States A-4 aircraft at the position of N2550 and E5350 intercepted and chased an Iranian sea-patrolling aircraft.

2. On 23 October 1990 at 1222 hours, two United States F-14 aircraft at the position of N2437 and E5756 intercepted and chased an Iranian sea-patrolling aircraft.

3. On 29 October 1990 at 1313 hours, two United States F-14 aircraft at the position of N2439 and E5727 intercepted and chased an Iranian sea-patrolling aircraft.

4. On 30 October 1990 at 1124 hours, two United States F-14 aircraft at the position of N2500 and E5755 intercepted and chased an Iranian sea-patrolling aircraft.

5. On 2 November 1990 at 1158 hours, three United States F-18 aircraft at the position of N2400 and E5744 intercepted and chased an Iranian sea-patrolling aircraft.

6. On 4 November 1990 at 1209 hours, two United States F-18 aircraft at the position of N2448 and E5803 intercepted and chased an Iranian sea-patrolling aircraft.

7. On 4 November 1990 at 1455 hours, United States A-6 aircraft number 605 at the position of N2434 and E5838 intercepted and chased an Iranian sea-patrolling aircraft.

8. On 5 November 1990 at 1209 hours, two United States F-18 aircraft at the position of N2446 and E5802 intercepted and chased an Iranian sea-patrolling aircraft.

9. On 8 November 1990 at 1006 hours, two United States A-7 aircraft at the position of N2604 and E5350 intercepted and chased an Iranian sea-patrolling aircraft.

10. On 9 November 1990 at 1154 hours, a United States A-6 aircraft at the position of N2450 and E5750 intercepted and chased an Iranian sea-patrolling aircraft.

11. On 11 November 1990 at 1155 hours, a United States F-18 aircraft at the position of N2513 and E5734 intercepted and chased an Iranian sea-patrolling aircraft.

12. On 12 November 1990 at 1224 hours, two United States F-18 aircraft, numbers 312 and 313, at the position of N2452 and E5755 intercepted and chased an Iranian sea-patrolling aircraft.

13. On 13 November 1990 at 1151 hours, a United States F-18 aircraft at the position of N2429 and E5802 intercepted and chased an Iranian sea-patrolling aircraft.

14. On 14 November 1990 at 1159 hours, two United States F-18 aircraft at the position of N2431 and E5743 intercepted and chased an Iranian sea-patrolling aircraft.

The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran protests such illegal activities by the Government of the United States.

Annex III

The Interests Section of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Washington, D.C. presents its compliments to the Embassy of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria and has the honour to quote the attached messages in two copies, the original text and an unofficial translation received from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran. It is respectfully requested that the original text of the messages be transmitted to the United States Department of State and our office be informed of their response.

According to information received from officials of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, on 16 November 1990 at 1340 hours United States aircraft aggressed into the territorial sea airspace of the Islamic Republic of Iran and at position N2630 and E5655 intercepted an Iranian sea-patrolling aircraft.

The occurrence of the United States aircraft's flight without prior permission and the disregard of the principles of international law are nothing but clear violations of the sovereignty and legal right to enforce the law of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Therefore, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran protests such lawlessness and the deliberate and unjustifiable actions of the United States aircraft which are contrary to the orders of international law of committed Governments and insistently demands that these aggressions be stopped.

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15 September 1992
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ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 12 SEPTEMBER 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Further to our letters concerning Iranian involvement in the plot against Iraq, the most recent being the letter dated 25 August 1992 (document S/24491), I have the honour to submit to you below the confessions of a number of Iranian spies arrested in Iraq, the confessions of a number of Iraqi prisoners enlisted by the Iranian regime to carry out acts of sabotage within Iraq, and the confessions of a number of saboteur deserters from military service who were enticed by the Iranian authorities and sent back to Iraq after receiving training courses in Iran for the purpose of committing crimes against Iraq and peaceable citizens.

A. Iranian spies

1. Guard Major Khoda Karam Sahrabi (intelligence officer), born in 1960, from the village of Sarab Maghab/City of Shiraz. Entered Iraq early this year (1992), and received training from two Guard intelligence officers at Shiraz, namely Lieutenant Colonel Hajj Shakib and Lieutenant Colonel Muhsin Mahziri (the latter being in charge of the investigation section of Guard intelligence). The above-mentioned was entrusted with espionage missions in northern Iraq, establishing contact with a number of elements present there, observation, and the collection of intelligence concerning the border strip, the Iraqi armed forces, the location of troop concentrations and the economic situation in Iraq.

2. Guard Qanbar Ali Azimi Najjad. Born at Bakhtaran in 1971. Entered Iraq in June 1992. Commissioned by Guard Lieutenant Colonel Hasan Mujammadi to collect information on the border strip, the population of the border regions, Iraq's means of dealing with persons infiltrating into Iraq for the purpose of sending further groups of saboteurs into the area; on the movements of Iraqi military units and their location; and on the activity of the Mojahedin-e Khalq organization. He was further commissioned to establish contact with a number of spies operating within Iraq on behalf of the Iranian regime.

B. Iraqi prisoners enlisted by the Iranian regime to carry out acts of sabotage within Iraq

1. Prisoner Yunus Nayif Hamzah, of Dhi Qar governorate, born in 1963, Red Cross identity number 65330. Taken prisoner on 20 January 1988. As a consequence of brainwashing during his captivity, he was forced to work with Iranian intelligence and trained in weaponry at the Hizbullah camp for the purpose of entering Iraq and carrying out acts of sabotage. Included among the duties with which he was entrusted were the blowing up of automotive vehicles and Government facilities and the kidnapping of Iraqi officials. He turned himself in to the Iraqi authorities at the first opportunity that offered itself.

2. Prisoner Shakir Hamid Tu'ma, from Maysan governorate, province of Al-Majarr al-Kabir. Red Cross identity number 10748. Taken prisoner on 17 January 1981 in the Shush operations sector. He was compelled to work with Iranian intelligence by means of brainwashing, which was practised on him by the Iranian regime during his captivity, and by being given training courses during July and August 1988 at the Hizbullah camp, whereafter he was sent into Iraq to conduct a reconnaissance mission. At the first opportunity that arose, he surrendered to the Iraqi authorities.

3. Prisoner Idris Khalil Yunus, born in 1955. Red Cross identity number 51110. Taken prisoner on 12 February 1985. He was subjected to brainwashing during his captivity, forced to work with Iranian intelligence and given training courses at the Toghar Amyin, Abu Dhar and Bakhtaran camps. He was selected to carry out acts of sabotage in northern Iraq, in addition to collecting information on the Kurds and the United Nations personnel present there and on their movements and changes of position, and to search for breaches that might facilitate Iranian infiltration operations into the northern regions and the city of Mosul in particular. At the first opportunity, he turned himself in to the Iraqi authorities in Mosul.

4. Prisoner Ali Kamal Taha, Red Cross identity number 44476. Taken prisoner on 14 July 1982 east of Basra. Compelled to work with Iranian intelligence and entrusted with missions for collecting information on the Kurdish parties and Iraqi military units in northern Iraq. He surrendered to the Iraqi authorities at the first opportunity that presented itself.

C. Saboteur deserters from military service

1. Warrant officer Ghubash Muhammad Jabr al-Zaidi, born in Maysan province in 1950. Deserted from military service on 2 November 1980 and took refuge in the marshes of southern Iraq. Recruited in 1987 by Iranian intelligence and carried out his designated role to recruit military deserters in the marshes to conduct reconnaissance of vital economic installations and the headquarters of accredited foreign diplomatic organizations in the country. Became a link between Abu Shihab Ahmad Faruzandeh, an Iranian intelligence official, and

groups of saboteurs operating in Baghdad, Basra and Maysan. Carried out the following sabotage operations:

(a) Threw a hand grenade into a club frequented by the foreign community in Aqabah Bin Nafi' Square in Baghdad.

(b) Blew up the oil pipeline connecting the oil storage area with the Dawrah refinery.

(c) Planted explosive charges under the cars of the Hungarian and Turkish ambassadors in Baghdad.

After carrying out the above acts of sabotage, he went to Iran, where he remained until the episode of betrayal and treachery, whereupon he returned to Iraq to oversee acts of sabotage and unrest in Maysan province in liaison with members of the so-called "Badr 9" forces. At the request of Hajj Hamid Taqwi, the deputy of Abu Shihab Ahmad Faruzandeh, he and his group retreated to Iran after Iraqi forces had gained control of the position in the marshes. In Iran, he met the agent Baqir al-Hakim, in addition to Ahmad Faruzandeh, who instructed him to form a military battalion in the marshes and supplied him with enormous sums of money. The battalion was formed under the name of the "Hassan Military Battalion" and was under the command of an individual called Rikan. After a series of conflicts and disputes between the saboteur leaders inside Iraq, al-Zaidi surrendered to the Iraqi authorities.

2. Conscript Khalid Karim Abd al-Lami. From Basra/Hayaniyah. Fled to Iran during the episode of betrayal and treachery, where he was recruited by Iranian intelligence, which sent him back to Iraq via the Shatt al-Arab. His mission was to take saboteurs over from the Iraqi side to the Iranian side across the Shatt al-Arab in a rowing boat. Was arrested on 22 June 1992 when attempting to take two saboteurs, namely, Samir Falih Abdul Zubaidi and Muhammad Ahmad al-Musawi, across the Shatt al-Arab.

3. Conscript Mahmud Ahmad Mahmud al-Musawi from the Qiblah region of Basra province. Captured by Iranian forces during the episode of betrayal and treachery and detained in Bayran Shah province. Following his recruitment, received training in weapons and explosives for the purpose of assassinating a number of officials in Iraq. Was provided with three forged identity cards: the first was a civil status identity card, the second an identity card for the paper factory and the third was issued by the history section of Mustansiriya University in Baghdad. Was also supplied with 6,000 counterfeit dinars and assigned the mission of reconnoitring the marsh region and conveying communiqués to the saboteurs in the region. Was also assigned to reconnoitre the military units in southern Iraq, concentrating on the Republican Guard units and their emplacements.

4. Conscript Samir Falih Abdul Zubaidi from Maysan province. Fled to Iran during the episode of betrayal and treachery, where he was recruited by Iranian intelligence and trained to carry out explosions and blow up vehicles. Was sent to Iraq for this purpose and to obtain information on certain

officials. Was supplied with four forged university student identity cards and a forged military service book.

In due course, I will be sending you two video tapes documenting the above confessions in detail as broadcast on Iraqi television. The above evidence unequivocally reveals Iran's violation of the principles of good-neighbourliness and its blatant intervention in the domestic affairs of Iraq.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

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15 September 1992
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 14 SEPTEMBER 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I should like to inform you that United States aircraft continued to violate Iraqi airspace for purposes of observation and provocation during the period 3 to 11 September 1992.

3-4 September 1992

(a) In the northern region: 20 sorties at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 2,000 to 6,500 metres. The flights were centred over the regions of Mosul, Arbil, Dohuk, Amadiyah, Zakho and Tall Afar.

(b) In the southern region: 102 sorties flown by F-14s, F-15s, F-16s and AWACs at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 7,000 to 9,000 metres. The flights were centred over the regions of Basra, Nasiriyah, Shatrah, Samawah, Amarah, Qurnah, Khidr, Jalibah, Artawi and Lasaf.

4-5 September 1992

(a) In the northern region: 28 sorties at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 4,000 to 6,000 metres. The flights were centred over the regions of Mosul, Arbil, Dohuk, Tall Afar, Amadiyah and Rawandoz.

(b) In the southern region: 70 sorties flown by F-4s, F-15s and F-16s at speeds of 600 to 720 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 4,000 to 12,000 metres. The flights were centred over the regions of Nasiriyah, Amarah, Basra, Samawah, Shatrah, the south of Diwaniyah, the south of Najaf, Qurnah, Salman and Ushbaijah.

5-6 September 1992

(a) In the northern region: 20 sorties at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 3,000 to 5,000 metres. The flights were centred over the regions of Mosul, Dohuk, Amadiyah, Arbil, Tall Afar, and Zakho.

(b) In the southern region: 95 sorties flown by F-4s, F-15s, F-16s and AWACs at speeds of 600 to 800 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 5,000 to 17,000 metres. The flights were centred over the regions of Basra, Amarah, Nasiriyah, Samawah, Qurnah, Ushbaijah, Khidr and Busayyah.

6-7 September 1992

(a) In the northern region: 2 sorties at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at an altitude of 5,000 metres. The flights were centred over Mosul, Dohuk, Zakho and Tall Afar.

(b) In the southern region: 84 sorties flown by F-4s, F-15s, F-16s and Mirages at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 5,000 to 10,000 metres. The flights were centred over the regions of Basra, Qurnah, Qal'at Salih, Nasiriyah, the south of Diwaniyah, Shatrah, Ushbaijah, Salman, Busayyah, Samawah, Khidr and Artawi.

7-8 September 1992

(a) In the northern region: No recorded activity.

(b) In the southern region: 86 sorties flown by F-4s, F-14s, F-15s, F-16s and Mirages at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 5,000 to 10,000 metres. The flights were centred over the regions of Basra, Nasiriyah, Amarah, Nasiriyah, Samawah, Qurnah and Busayyah.

9-10 September 1992

(a) In the northern region: 16 sorties at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 4,000 to 5,000 metres. The flights were centred over Mosul, Arbil, Dohuk and Amadiyah.

(b) In the southern region: 117 sorties flown by F-4s, F-14s, F-15s and F-16s at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 5,000 to 11,000 metres. The flights were centred over the regions of Basra, Nasiriyah, Salman, Samawah and Busayyah.

10-11 September 1992

(a) In the northern region: 6 sorties at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 5,000 to 7,000 metres. The flights were centred over Mosul, Arbil, Zakho, Amadiyah and Dohuk.

(b) In the southern region: 62 sorties flown by F-4s, F-15s and F-16s at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 5,000 to 11,000 metres. The flights were centred over the regions of Nasiriyah, Salman and Busayyah. At 1132 hours, the sound barrier was broken above the town of Nasiriyah by four formations of United States F-15 aircraft flying at an altitude of 8,000 metres.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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S/24564
15 September 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 15 SEPTEMBER 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CROATIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to enclose herewith a facsimile letter dated 9 September 1992 from the President of the Republic of Croatia, Dr. Franjo Tudman.

We would kindly request that this letter be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ambassador Dr. Mario NOBILO
Permanent Representative of the
Republic of Croatia to the
United Nations

Annex

Letter dated 9 September 1992 from the President of the Republic of Croatia addressed to the Secretary-General

On behalf of the Republic of Croatia and in my own name, I would once again like to thank you for your support and assistance along the difficult road towards the establishment and preservation of peace in Croatia.

Nevertheless, I would at this point in time like to draw your attention to certain important facts, and urge additional decisions of the Security Council in order to enhance efficiently as much as possible the implementation of the peace plan of Mr. Cyrus Vance.

1. The objective of the Vance Plan as contained in annex III to the Secretary-General's report of 11 December 1991 (S/23280), in accordance with which demilitarization of the United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs) is under way, is the return to their homes - in line with established United Nations policy - of all persons displaced during the hostilities wishing to do so (para. 20).

This process should be implemented as fast as possible, but it is not being implemented with the required urgency. Serbs in the occupied areas of the Republic of Croatia (UNPAs) turn down or delay the implementation of the UNPA demilitarization process, which includes the withdrawal of the units of the former Yugoslav army, the disbanding and demobilization of local units, the surrender of weapons and their placement in custody, and the removal of mines and fortifications.

2. To this very day the Republic of Croatia is being attacked and ravaged by Serbian forces from the neighbouring Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

According to the latest data of the Office for Refugees and Displaced Persons of the Republic of Croatia (26 August 1992), Croatia is caring for 635,781 registered displaced persons and refugees (267,500 displaced persons and 368,281 refugees). Together with non-registered persons, at present there are, according to estimates, more than 400,000 refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Vojvodina in the territory of Croatia.

The Republic of Croatia is no longer capable of accepting refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina, and its economic stability has been seriously affected.

Banished from their homes, aware of the incessant plunder and destruction of their property in the UNPAs which they were forced to abandon under duress, the Croatian population are no longer ready to tolerate delays in the implementation of the peace-keeping operation in the territory of Croatia.

The Government of Croatia is holding, with utmost efforts, under control the swollen, now also partly destructive energy of the tens of thousands of sufferers who had to leave their homes because of aggression.

3. After the assumption of responsibility in all the four sectors (UNPAs) by the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), the process of demilitarization is proceeding at an uneven rate. The reasons are to be sought exclusively in the behaviour of the other side.

The behaviour of the occupation authorities in the UNPAs is focused exclusively on the establishment of their armed rule and further destruction of the property of the displaced Croatian population in order to delay their return. These actions are aimed at destabilizing Croatia (traffic arteries outside the UNPAs remain within heavy-weapon range; power supply and telecommunications, and water supply sources and systems are disrupted).

In the marginal areas of the UNPAs, distinctive provocations include the advancing of the aggressor's strongholds and renewed construction of fortifications, the transit of armed groups across UNPA borders, the thwarting and even the seizure of UNPROFOR checkpoints (the most recent example involves the taking over of control on the Danube bridge between Batina and Bezdan by the militia of the so-called Serbian Republic of Krajina).

If UNPROFOR does not have the mandate and the means to put an end to such behaviour of the aggressor, then their mandate should be expanded by a decision of the Security Council.

4. The Republic of Croatia urges the efficient implementation of UNPROFOR operations in accordance with the United Nations peace plan. In the view of the Republic of Croatia, one should immediately and selectively, in parallel with the process of demilitarization, set the deadline and start implementing the return of the displaced Croatian and other non-Serbian population to the UNPAs and to all the "pink zones".

The return to certain parts of the UNPAs especially in Sector East, settled before the war by Croats and Hungarians, is possible under international supervision. Such return should be provided for by no later than 30 September 1992, because of farming work, the start of the school year and the coming winter.

At the same time, the Republic of Croatia is ready, in cooperation with UNPROFOR and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), to prepare and implement the project of return of the Serbian population which had left the UNPA in Sector West. This return will additionally be stimulated by the envisaged abolition and amnesty to cover all those that were misled or forced to take part in armed action against the Republic of Croatia, and who have not perpetrated war crimes.

Return should start as soon as feasible to the "pink zones" and, selectively, to the areas of Sector East, to be followed by selective return to Sector West, and Sectors North and South.

5. The Republic of Croatia has met all the requirements laid down by the international community with regard to the assurance of ethnic rights to national minorities. The Republic of Croatia will provide all the conditions for the work of the representative of the United Nations and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe commissions for human rights. As a participant of the London Conference, the Republic of Croatia requests that Serbia, too, should respect The Hague and Brussels documents, CSCE documents, the Charter of the United Nations and Security Council resolutions.

6. The Republic of Croatia proposes to the Security Council to urgently consider and enact decisions concerning the following requests:

(a) To request, in accordance with the Vance Plan and the respective agreements, the complete withdrawal of the so-called Yugoslav army from Dubrovnik and the surrounding region;

(b) To effect immediately the take-over of the Peruća hydropower plant, security to be provided for by UNPROFOR;

(c) To permit access to the Maslenica Strait, and the construction of the pontoon bridge, security to be provided by UNPROFOR;

(d) To permit the operation of the Adriatic Oil Pipeline, a facility not only of interest to Croatia but also to Hungary, the Czech and Slovak Republic, and Bosnia and Herzegovina;

(e) To open the Zagreb-Slavonski Brod motorway, security to be provided for by UNPROFOR along the motorway section crossing the UNPA;

(f) To assure water supply for the Dalmatian region, and particularly for the Zadar area, and provide for the operation of the overhead power transmission system in order to ensure the supply of electricity to the Dalmatian region.

The implementation of all these requests will directly influence the course, speed and cost of the UNPROFOR peace operation. Let me note that all these requests are in accordance with the decisions reached at the London Conference. The solution of these problems could also facilitate the extension of mandate of the peace-keeping force to Bosnia and Herzegovina because the existing UNPROFOR, after the completion of their mission in Croatia, could be sent to Bosnia and Herzegovina, which would reduce the overall cost of the UNPROFOR operation.

Zagreb, 9 September 1992

The President
of the Republic of Croatia

Dr. Franjo Tudman